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Abstract
This article discusses the position and agency of Romani migrants. It argues that different states 
often irregularize the status of Romani migrants even in cases where it should be regularized 
due to their de jure citizenship. This irregularization is possible because of their position as semi-
citizens in their ‘states of origin’. Yet, Romani migrants are not mere passive observers of these 
practices, but react to their irregularized migrant statuses. In doing so, they redefine their national 
and European citizenships. This article centres around two case studies to analyse the position and 
agency of Romani migrants The first is Roma with European Union (EU) citizenship and the second 
is post-Yugoslav Roma without EU citizenship.
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Introduction
At a time when there is a proliferation of possibilities for geographic mobility and resi-
dence in countries other than one’s own for most people with a regular status in Europe, 
the mobility of Romani minorities still remains a widely discussed and highly contested 
topic (Parker, 2012; Van Baar, 2015). Many politicians, not only those on the far right 
spectrum, collectively view Roma as abusers of their right to free movement – they often 
portray Romani migrants with European Union (EU) citizenship as potential ‘welfare 
tourists’ while also classifying those without EU citizenship coming from the post-Yugo-
slav space as potential ‘bogus’ asylum seekers (Kacarska, 2012). In this article, I present 
a twofold argument on Romani migrants that challenges these views on their status and 
political agency. First, I claim that different states use such reasoning about problematic 
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Romani mobility to govern, control, and also collectively restrict the free movement and 
accompanied rights of Romani migrants. Second, Romani individuals are not passive 
observers of these processes, but react in response. I argue that their reaction can be 
understood as a form of latent protest to the restriction of their rights.
By investigating and comparing the position of Romani migrants with and without EU 
citizenship in two contexts, I claim that different states render Roma as ‘unwanted 
migrants’ by irregularizing their migrant status. The case studies in this article demon-
strate that the position of many Romani migrants is specific when compared to the posi-
tion of other irregular migrants. The irregularization of their migrant status and the 
restriction of accompanied rights occur even in cases when this status should be consid-
ered regular due to their de jure citizenship. The process that contributes to the irregu-
larization of migration, to use the concept of (Jansen et al., 2015), positions Romani 
migrants in a legal limbo somewhere on a scale between regular and irregular migrant 
status, where they also fall into the regime of deportability (De Genova, 2002). This legal 
limbo points to the fact that there is a ‘dialectical process’ (De Genova, 2015: 6) between 
inclusion and exclusion rather than a binary opposition. I employ the theory developed by 
Elizabeth Cohen (2009) to argue that the creation of irregularized migrant statuses is 
made possible in the case of Roma because their own states position them as semi-
citizens in the first place. In this article, I analyse how the irregularization of migration 
status is connected to the semi-citizenship status of Romani migrants, who either do not 
possess the rights that should be theirs by virtue of their citizenship or cannot access 
citizenship because they were migrants.
In the first part of the article, I examine the case of the Romani individuals with EU 
citizenship who are mobile between different EU states and how state authorities make 
them deportable, despite the restriction of deportability enshrined in the Free Movement 
of Citizens Directive 2004/38/EC. In the second part of the article, I focus on the position 
of non-EU Romani forced migrants residing in different post-Yugoslav states, who found 
themselves in a very particular predicament after the dissolution of the Yugoslav state. 
Armed conflicts and the subsequent redefinition of citizenship boundaries in newly estab-
lished states left these migrants ‘legally invisible’ and de facto stateless – while unable to 
regularize their citizenship status in their country of residence. They also possessed an 
ineffective citizenship of another post-Yugoslav state due to their inability to access iden-
tification documents proving the latter citizenship (Sardelić, 2015: 164). The case of 
legally invisible persons, most of them are Romani migrants (PRAXIS, 2011), is to a 
certain extent unique to the post-conflict space. However, I will also highlight another 
case of post-Yugoslav Romani migrants whose status was also irregularized and whose 
movement was restricted while they were mobile between the EU and their own non-EU 
states.
Different international organizations (IOs) and activist non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) have put the irregularized status position of EU, as well as non-EU, Romani 
migrants under scrutiny in order to improve their position. Yet, the reports of these IOs 
and NGOs only marginally mention the coping strategies which Romani migrants employ 
to deal with their irregularized migrant statuses. Scholarly literature has to a large extent 
ignored the issue until recently. Only a few scholars have discussed coping strategies in 
their work (cf. Aradau et al., 2013; Caglar and Mehling, 2013; Faure Atger, 2013). Many 
had previously focused on the activism of Romani individuals linked to civil society 
movements (McGarry, 2010; Vermeersch, 2006). The social movement’s literature has 
paid less attention to how Romani migrants outside formal civil society movements 
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addressed their own position (Grill, 2012) as this was not understood as a form of activ-
ism. I aim to show that it is crucial to explore the agency of irregularized Romani migrants 
for two reasons. First, similar to other marginalized populations, Romani migrants pos-
sess their own agency to address their position. Second, by addressing their irregularized 
statuses, Romani migrants use their own agency to redefine the existing content of their 
national citizenship (and its related rights) as well as that of European citizenship, from 
both inside and outside of these frameworks (Isin, 2013: 20). I claim that their specific 
agency manifesting itself in day-to-day coping strategies is in fact how these migrants 
enact their citizenship (Isin, 2015: 23) and are thus activist citizens (Isin, 2013: 24), even 
in such cases where they do not possess even the most basic identification documents 
such as birth certificates. On the basis of selected case studies, this article points to 
some of the enactments of citizenship that state authorities usually interpret as the collec-
tive anti-social behaviour and practices of Roma as a group. However, I argue that these 
are in fact counter-agency practices which Romani migrants use to subvert discrimination 
against them both as migrants and as citizens.
Theoretical premises: Irregularization of migration,  
semi-citizenship, and its enactment from the margins
This article is in dialogue with three theoretical strands. Through the analysis of the 
selected case studies on the position of EU and non-EU Romani migrants, the article will 
show the intertwinement of these theoretical strands. First, I examine how ‘destination’ 
states irregularize the legal status of Romani migrants, in order to govern their mobility 
more easily and to restrict the right of free movement these migrants have by virtue of 
their citizenship status. According to the understanding of Jansen et al. (2015), the grow-
ing complexities of borders also bring more possibilities for the ‘irregularization of 
migration’. This gives different states more manoeuvring space to control the presence 
of unwanted populations in their territory by redefining previously regular migration as 
irregular. States use this manoeuvring space to prevent these populations from crossing 
the border or to make them subject to a regime of deportability (De Genova, 2002).
However, the positions of many Romani migrants are specific within processes of 
irregularization. According to Huub Van Baar (2015: 77), even when Romani migrants 
who possess EU citizenship travel between two EU member states, they often end up 
being treated as third-country nationals (TNCs). I argue that by irregularizing their migra-
tion status, states effectively strip Romani EU migrants of their rights granted to them by 
the Free Movement of Citizens Directive (2004/38/EC). In my second case study, I dem-
onstrate how the retroactive irregularization of their migration status in the post-Yugo-
slav space has left many Romani individuals legally invisible and without access to 
citizenship (Sardelić, 2015) or without the right to leave their own country, despite having 
the proper documents to do so (Kacarska, 2012). Following the argument by Jansen 
et al. (2015: ix), which draws from the theory of Étienne Balibar, the irregularization of 
migration is paradoxically possible due to the ubiquity of borders, which are no longer 
physically present (as in the case of the Schengen area), but enter the everyday lives of 
‘unwanted migrants’. This is especially visible in the case of ‘poor migrants’ (Jansen 
et al., 2015: ix) who are seen as contributing neither to the formal labour market nor to the 
informal economy of the recipient state.
The statuses of Romani migrants are usually collectively bordered (De Genova, 2015: 
3) within a state territory and hence collectively irregularized. The irregularization does 
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not exclude and expel Romani migrants per se, but positions them in a legal limbo 
between regular and irregular status in the never-ending chain of selective ‘illegality’ 
production (De Genova, 2002, 2015: 8). Hence, while building upon their theoretical 
approach, in contrast to Jansen et al. (2015), I investigate the approaches states apply to 
irregularize the statuses of Romani migrants once they are already present in the state, 
and how Romani are ‘differentially included when residing on the territory’ (Anderson 
and Hughes, 2015: 1). I use the term irregularized migrant statuses instead of irregular 
migrant statuses to highlight the fact that state actions redefine their position from regular 
to irregularized and produce their illegality (De Genova, 2002).
Second, on the basis of the case studies analysed, I claim that the irregularization of 
migrant statuses is possible because the Romani migrants in question are semi-citizens of 
their own states. Romani migrants are not full citizens of their states, but semi-citizens 
because they do not possess all the rights their citizenship should grant them. As Cohen 
(2009: 2) argues:
the statuses held by this group do not fully confirm to the standard definition of citizenship. 
Nonetheless, all of them have some of the political characteristics associated with citizenship. 
They hold some rights and receive political recognition consistent with that accorded to citizens. 
This places them in political categories between citizens and non-citizens. (Cohen, 2009: 2)
In the case of Romani migrants, such an in-between position brings with it many con-
straints. Applying Cohen’s theory to two case studies, I investigate how Romani migrants 
can be categorized as fourth-order semi-citizens with weak relative and autonomous 
rights (Cohen, 2009:72), bearing in mind that their statuses are quite diverse. While some 
lack access to certain rights, others lack access to citizenship, but all have their free move-
ment restricted. I also adhere to Cohen’s claim that semi-citizenship is an in-between 
political category that reflects the conflicts and vulnerabilities of full citizenship status. 
Additionally, it gives state authorities more flexibility to accord different sets of rights to 
residents on their territory (Cohen, 2009: 95–140). However, stemming from Cohen’s 
reasoning, semi-citizenship is also a possible place of invention from where semi-citizens 
can readdress and also redefine the content of full citizenship. Here, I shift the under-
standing of semi-citizenship from mere arrangements to enactment, following the theory 
of Engin Isin (2013: 21). Romani migrants readdress their own position as semi-citizens 
and irregularized migrants through their agency and a specific kind of the enactment of 
citizenship (Isin, 2015). However, this does not mean that this specific enactment stems 
from any kind of ethnic exceptionalism, but reflects state practices of irregularization.
The last strand of the theory upon which I base my analysis is the enactment of 
European citizenship (Isin, 2013). Romani migrants, both within the EU and on its mar-
gins, enact European citizenship from their position as semi-citizens and irregularized 
migrants. As Isin (2013: 20) argues, ‘… European citizenship becomes most productive 
precisely when it manifests as citizenship-to-come, as enacted by those who constitute 
themselves as claimants to a Europe-to-come’. Therefore, it is not only Romani EU citi-
zens who are enacting European citizenship, but similar to Kurds in Turkey (Rumelili and 
Keyman, 2013: 66–83), the Roma in the post-Yugoslav space without EU citizenship 
enact it as well. They enact European citizenship by virtue of being citizens-to-come. I 
will describe how IOs, Romani, and non-Romani human rights activists put the position 
of the legal invisibility of Roma at the forefront of debates on visa liberalization as well 
as on EU membership conditionality in the Western Balkans. However, I also highlight 
the agency of irregularized Romani migrants. There have been many different European 
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Commission (EC)-funded programmes aimed at including Roma as ‘active’ citizens in 
the belief that such engagement would bring to an end their discrimination and marginali-
zation. Such programmes often portrayed Roma as passive observers of their situation 
who need to activate themselves in order to change their position. These programmes 
prescribed what acts of citizenship should be (Isin, 2015: 24); however, in doing so, that 
Roma already challenged their current marginalization through their own acts of citizen-
ship was completely ignored. This is both a conceptual and political shortcoming for as 
Isin (2015: 24) notes, acts of citizenship:
… immediately evokes such acts as voting, taxpaying and service in the military. But these are 
routine social actions that are already instituted. By contrast, following the earlier discussion, 
acts introduce a rupture in the given by being creative, unauthorized and unconventional. (Isin, 
2015: 24)
On the basis of the case studies, I also examine the position of irregularized Romani 
migrants who are not involved in Romani rights social movements. However, they enact 
their citizenship through their everyday practices and coping strategies, which are usually 
not perceived as acts of citizenship, but rather as the anti-social behaviour of Roma as a 
specific ethnic group. I aim to show that their coping strategies reveal ruptures in the sys-
tem that, for example, hinder access to health care and employment for some while render-
ing their movement problematic. Romani individuals in this context should be understood 
as activist citizens because they creatively, unconventionally, and without authorization, 
subvert the logic of the system that discriminates against them (Isin, 2015: 24).
Methodology
The research of this article was primarily based on two qualitative approaches. First, I 
conducted a socio-legal analysis of the documents and reports produced by think tanks and 
human rights advocacy NGOs dealing with the position of Romani migrants. While criti-
cally analysing these documents, I was particularly interested in identifying approaches 
applied by states to irregularize Romani migrants and seeing whether certain enactments 
of citizenship by Romani migrants have been noted as subverting the system. Second, I 
used a socio-cognitive approach to critical discourse analysis (CDA) developed by Teun 
Van Dijk (1993) to highlight how media discourses on Romani migrants portray their acts 
of citizenship. While the findings of this article are based mostly on these two approaches, 
I also conducted field interviews with the representatives of IOs, national governments, 
and Romani NGOs in the post-Yugoslav space. I also conducted fieldwork with participant 
observation in several Romani communities and refugee camps, such as Konik on the 
outskirts of Podgorica, where many Romani individuals displaced by the Kosovo conflict 
still live as irregularized migrants. This was important so as to confirm that irregularized 
migrants create parallel spaces to gain access to rights which are formally not granted to 
them (Sigona, 2015). However, due to ethical considerations (possible identification of 
individuals and sensitive data), I did not use the interview transcripts in this article.
Irregularized statuses and counter-agency of Romani 
migrants with EU citizenship
The Free Movement of Citizens Directive (2004/38/EC) enshrines the right of EU 
nationals to move and reside in an EU country other than their own as one of the EU 
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fundamental principles. Yet this right comes with certain restrictions: EU citizens can 
reside in another EU member state with a valid passport for a period of 3 months, after 
which they need to prove their economic activity, or sufficient resources to sustain them-
selves and valid health insurance. Moreover, according to Article 15 of the Directive, 
there are also procedural safeguards stipulating when this fundamental right of free 
movement can be restricted. Restrictions are permitted in the interest of public policy, 
public health, and public safety. But even when EU citizens face expulsion, they cannot 
be banned from reentering the country they were removed from (Article 27).
The principle of free movement had already been defined in the European Community 
by the Treaty of Rome as ‘freedom of movement of persons, services, and capital’ 
(Article 48). However, all these freedoms were directly linked to economic needs in the 
European Community, including the free movement of persons, which in fact referred 
to the movement of workers. With the Free Movement of Citizens Directive, this was 
transformed so that such a direct link to the economy was at least partially decoupled 
from the right to free movement (Carrera, 2005). Yet, the restrictions after the initial 
3-month period make it clear that the Free Movement of Citizens Directive was not 
envisioned to solve, by way of migration, economic disparities within the EU, or to be 
‘taken advantage’ of by ‘poor migrants’ (Jansen et al., 2015: ix) who seek to move from 
less ‘prosperous’ parts of the EU to the more ‘prosperous’ ones. The old EU Member 
States usually portrayed such migrants as the ‘undeserving poor’ (Anderson, 2013: 50). 
However, the problematization of the free movement of poor migrants, such as many 
Romani individuals, was no longer framed directly in economic terms, but rather in 
terms of security, as argued by Huub Van Baar (2015: 75). This particular framing was 
used because the Free Movement of Citizens Directive does not allow for the expulsion 
of poor migrants on economic grounds (Article 27).
Many politicians, especially those from France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, have 
questioned whether free movement as a fundamental right of EU citizens should 
apply unconditionally to all because, as they argue, some EU citizens abuse this right and 
become an unreasonable burden for the host state (Faure Atger, 2013: 182; Ram, 2014: 
207). Such politicians expressed apprehension regarding the (potential) free movement of 
Romani individuals with citizenship in post-socialist states, which had just joined the EU 
with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Of particular concern were Romania and Bulgaria, 
which according to some estimates are home to almost 3 million Roma (Liégeois, 2007). 
The main cause for this concern was the belief that with the right to free movement, cou-
pled by their ‘nomadic culture’, Roma would migrate en masse towards Western Europe 
after EU Enlargement. Previous socialist governments had severely controlled and 
impeded the movement of Roma. These governments portrayed mobility as one of the 
misconducts of Roma as a social group (Barany, 2002; McGarry, 2010). During EU mem-
bership negotiations with post-socialist states, one of the most prominent topics was the 
protection of Roma minority rights on the basis of the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria (Ram, 
2014; Spirova and Budd, 2008; Vermeersch, 2012). But this was not merely out of humani-
tarian concern for Roma but also precisely because of the expressed fear of Romani mass 
migration (Kymlicka, 2007: 77). According to the limited quantitative data available, 
mass migration of Roma did not occur after the 2004 and 2007 enlargements (Guild and 
Cahn, 2010; Pantea, 2013). Most Roma living on the verge of absolute poverty in Eastern 
Europe do not have resources or networks to migrate. Therefore, poverty cannot be con-
sidered as one of the main ‘push factors’ (Pantea, 2013; Vlase and Voicu, 2013). Neither 
can the ‘Romani culture’ (Grill, 2012). Yet, despite its low numbers, the movement of 
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Romani migrants remains the most visible form of intra-EU migration. Similarly, as with 
other unwanted migrant groups, different state representatives have used the ‘politics of 
fear’ (Furedi, 2007; Huysmans, 2006; Wodak, 2015), to frame Romani migration as a 
securitization concern (Van Baar, 2015) in order to legitimize the irregularization of their 
status.
The free movement of Romani migrants became one of the most contentiously debated 
issues not only on the subject of the Roma writ large (Grill, 2012; Pantea, 2013; Ram, 
2014; Vermeersch, 2012) but also in the context of the Free Movement of Citizens 
Directive (Carrera and Faure Atger, 2010; Faure Atger, 2013; Parker and Toke, 2013). It 
also became a source of discord between some EU member states and the European 
Commission. This was especially visible during the intense debates in the European 
Parliament in the wake of the 2010 collective expulsions and demolition of Romani 
migrant camps in France, which became known as L’Affaire des Roms.
In the summer of 2010, Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French President, called for the 
dismantling of informal settlements. According to him, they posed a threat to public order 
and public health (Faure Atger, 2013: 183). In the case of Bulgarian and Romanian citi-
zens, such reinterpretation of informal settlements as a security threat (Van Baar, 2015: 
75) irregularized their migrant status as EU citizens and gave grounds for their expulsion 
from France (Faure Atger, 2013: 183). At that time, their right to work in some other EU 
countries was restricted until 2013. Thus, Romani migrants from Bulgaria and Romania 
could be considered EU semi-citizens (Faure Atger, 2013: 184). Although they could not 
be expelled on economic grounds, when their initial EU semi-citizenship status was cou-
pled with their irregularized migrant status, they fell under the regime of deportability 
(De Genova, 2002).
While French authorities denied this, the dismantling of informal camps targeted 
Romanian or Bulgarian citizens who were Roma (Faure Atger, 2013: 183). Such dispro-
portionate, and even discriminatory, practices against Roma by the French authorities 
elicited responses from various human rights activists and advocacy NGOs in France and 
beyond (Ram, 2014: 208). These civil society actors advocated the rights of Romani 
migrants at the EU level and raised this issue in a discussion with Viviane Reding, who at 
the time was the European Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and 
Citizenship. Faure Atger (2013: 191) interpreted such a campaign for Roma rights by 
many different NGOs as acts of citizenship:
the French Roma affair demonstrated that the right to claim rights is enacted not only by those 
whose rights are denied, but also by those who can declare solidarity with them. In this case, it 
is the acts of NGOs that dismantled the barriers standing in the way of the enjoyment of rights 
of EU citizens, which had been erected by French policies. (Faure Atger, 2013: 191)
As a result of these acts of citizenship performed by many different pro-Roma NGOs, 
the French authorities changed their treatment of Romani migrants with EU citizenship. 
Mass collective expulsions stopped and to a certain extent, the demolitions of informal 
settlements. Still, what the existing analysis lacks is the nature of acts of citizenship per-
formed in the course of these events by Romani migrants themselves. Several anthropo-
logical studies (Grill, 2012; Nacu, 2012; Pantea, 2013; Vlase and Voicu, 2013) offered 
perspectives of Romani migrants on their reasons for migration, but these studies did not 
frame their perspectives as acts of citizenship or as the enactment of European citizenship 
(Isin, 2013).
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Owing to the fact that different civil society organizations and advocacy groups criti-
cized such practices as discriminatory, the French authorities no longer conduct such 
extensive demolitions of Roma settlements and expulsions of Roma to other EU coun-
tries. Nevertheless, they ‘invented’ new approaches for expelling Romani migrants with 
EU citizenship, such as facilitated voluntary return and ‘humanitarian’ aid (Balkaninsight, 
2011). France in particular, but also some other EU countries, decided to simply adopt 
different strategies to irregularize their migrant status. One strategy was even co-funded 
by the EC. The French Office for Immigration and Integration (FOII) received EUR 
34,760,077 for ‘voluntary return’ activities. In exchange for voluntary return to their 
country of citizenship, the FOII offered cash bursaries that covered a one-way flight but 
also added an additional ‘developmental’ or ‘humanitarian’ amount so that returnees 
could start a business in their countries of origin. The EC (2011) argued that:
the Project has had a positive impact: it facilitated return on a voluntary basis, ensuring the 
rights of migrants and initiating both sustainable return and reintegration in the individuals’ 
country of origin. With the financial allowance, migrants were able to establish a new economic 
activity in their home country.
Although this project did not only target Romani migrants, many beneficiaries were 
identified as Roma. The outcome of this new strategy was, however, unexpected. As 
reported by Balkaninsight, even more Romani migrants with EU citizenship started com-
ing to France despite the knowledge that they would be expelled through the method of 
‘voluntary return’ (Balkaninsight, 2011). Many more decided to migrate to France, not 
because of their ‘nomadic culture’, but because of their semi-citizenship position at the 
national and EU level. It was clear to these Romani migrants that they would be expelled, 
and they were also aware that the financial allowance would not be sufficient to help them 
start their own micro-business, for example, in agriculture. What the French authorities 
failed to realize in this case was that discrimination against Roma in their own countries 
is far more multi-layered and cannot be unravelled by this type of a ‘quick fix’ approach. 
Romani individuals who decided to migrate from Bulgaria and Romania to France were 
themselves aware of this. However, for many of them this was one of the coping strate-
gies to deal with their marginalized position due to discrimination closely connected to 
socio-economic inequalities. Nevertheless, this was neither merely a coping strategy nor 
the manifestation of Romani anti-social behaviour to abuse certain benefits, as some 
authorities claimed. It was in fact the means by which Romani individuals, who were not 
part of civil society organizations, manifested their own agency in order to warn that such 
programmes are not sustainable and hence enacted their European citizenship.
The irregularized position and coping strategies of de  
facto stateless and legally invisible Roma in the non-EU 
post-Yugoslav contexts
Romani minorities in the post-Yugoslav space found themselves in a certain in-between-
ness (Bhabha, 1994; Vidmar Horvat, 2009) not only due to the legacy of the physical 
conflict but also as a result of a symbolic conflict, whereby the boundaries of citizenry 
were redefined in each individual state (Sardelić, 2015: 166–167). However, the dynam-
ics in the post-Yugoslav space remained to a large extent distinctive from constellations 
within the EU. While Roma in the EU context were clearly defined as the unwanted Other 
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(Okely, 1994), Roma in the non-EU post-Yugoslav space remained mostly invisible, both 
during and post-conflict (Krasniqi, 2015: 210). In this space, the position of the defining 
unwanted Other was reserved for the more dominant minorities with destabilizing territo-
rial demands (Sardelić, 2015: 163; Vermeersch, 2006: 6). This was especially visible in 
the case of Romani minorities from Kosovo. During the Kosovo conflicts in the late 
1990s, almost 90% of the Romani population of Kosovo became forcibly displaced (Perić 
and Demirovski, 2000), either internally (European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), 2011: 
58; Krasniqi, 2015: 211) or as refugees in neighbouring post-Yugoslav countries such as 
Montenegro (Džankić, 2012: 347) and Macedonia (Spaskovska, 2012: 387) as well as in 
the EU countries such as Italy (Sigona, 2003; Solimene, 2011). While other Kosovar 
populations were also displaced, Romani minorities belong to the ones with the lowest 
rates of return to their previous homes (Đorđević, 2015: 134). Thus, they remain in the 
position of long-term forced migrants, and hence long-term displaced.
Several scholars including Sigona (2015) have described the dynamics between the 
position and agency of post-Yugoslav Romani forced migrants living in EU countries 
such as Italy. In contrast to Sigona, I highlight the position of those Romani forced 
migrants who remained in the post-Yugoslav space. Their position is especially thought-
provoking as the evidence suggests how ‘borders cross everyone, including those who 
never crossed borders’ (De Genova, 2015: 12). It also exemplifies how ‘borders are 
deployed strategically but always operate tactically’ (De Genova, 2015: 7). The largest 
share of Romani minorities from Kosovo is still displaced within different post-Yugoslav 
states (Sardelić, 2015; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
2011). When these minorities were compelled to flee their homes at the end of the 1990s, 
future international borders had not yet been completely defined since new post-Yugoslav 
states were still in the process of emergence. Many Romani individuals fled from Kosovo 
to Montenegro. At that time, these were two different parts of the same Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY). With subsequent proclamations of independence, the FRY was 
later divided into three separate parts: Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. When Romani 
individuals from Kosovo came to Montenegro, they were categorized as internally dis-
placed (UNHCR, 2011: 13). However, after the new borders between Serbia, Montenegro 
(2006), and Kosovo (2008) had been drawn, the UNHCR insisted that internally dis-
placed Romani individuals should be re-categorized as refugees (UNHCR, 2011: 13) due 
to the fact that they were no longer displaced within the territory of their country of citi-
zenship. On the contrary, the Montenegrin authorities insisted that because they did not 
cross the international border at the time when they fled their homes, they should con-
tinue to be categorized as internally displaced persons. Since the Montenegrin authorities 
did not classify these Romani individuals from Kosovo as refugees, they were not eligible 
for international protection granted by the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967). Having the status of an 
internally displaced person rather than that of a refugee, made it easier to categorize them 
as irregular and potentially rendered them illegal. Romani individuals found themselves 
held hostage to the debate on the political redefinition of who will be entitled to 
Montenegrin citizenship after independence in 2006 (Džankić, 2012). Montenegro does 
not allow dual citizenship (Džankić, 2012: 344) due to the prospect of extensive overlap 
between Montenegrin and Serbian citizenship. Although this policy was not intended to 
specifically target Romani individuals, it presented many obstacles for them in regular-
izing their position by becoming citizens of the state in which they had been de facto 
living (Sardelić, 2015: 167). While fleeing their homes in Kosovo, many of them left 
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without their personal identification documents, which they did not need at the time since 
they were not crossing any international borders. At the same time, citizen registries were 
destroyed in Kosovo (UNHCR, 2011), and these individuals found themselves de facto 
stateless; they had Serbian citizenship, yet they could not prove it (Sardelić, 2015: 171). 
In order to regularize their alien status and permanent residence in Montenegro, in accord-
ance with the ‘Strategy for durable solutions of issues regarding displaced and internally 
displaced persons in Montenegro with a special emphasis on the Konik area’ (Montenegro 
Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 2011) and the Act on Amendment of the Act on 
Aliens, they needed documents to prove their citizenship, otherwise they could be irregu-
larized, labelled as ‘illegally residing’ in Montenegro, and deported (Sardelić, 2015: 171). 
However, as the international border between Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro had been 
created after they left, they could not obtain these documents on their own since they 
could not cross the border to enter their country of citizenship (Sardelić, 2015). Due to 
these obstacles, the final act of the irregularization of Romani migrant statuses has until 
now been constantly put ‘on hold’ by decisions of the Montenegrin Government to pro-
long the period during which the status of displaced persons needs to be regularized.
In Montenegro, as well as in other states of the former Yugoslavia, Romani migrants 
have faced problems in access to their personal identification documents, which has 
impeded their access to citizenship. The fact that access to citizenship was impeded also 
prevented them from obtaining official residency in the state in which they actually 
resided. As a result, the migrant status of these individuals went through a three-stage 
sequence of irregularization as they neither enjoyed protection accorded to citizens and/
or residents nor international protection afforded to stateless persons. The affected indi-
viduals were left without international protection while becoming de facto stateless and 
legally invisible (Sardelić, 2015: 169). However, in contrast to the irregularization of the 
migrant status of Romani individuals with EU citizenship exercising mobility within the 
EU, the irregularized status of Romani migrants in the post-Yugoslav states cannot be 
directly seen as an outcome of intentional targeting. The irregularization of their status 
was in fact a product of their invisibility and the initial lack of consideration for their 
uniquely marginalized position.
The position of legally invisible and de facto stateless Romani minorities in the non-
EU post-Yugoslav states only became much more prominent during the ‘Europeanization’ 
period. Before the accession negotiations and the resulting conditionality, the 
‘Europeanization’ element was also present in the processes of Schengen visa policy lib-
eralization for the Western Balkan countries (Kacarska, 2012). The visa liberalization 
processes also included benchmarks (Block 4) for ensuring freedom of movement to all 
citizens of the country in question through the unhindered provision of access to identity 
documents and protection of minority rights (Kacarska, 2012: 6). It soon emerged that the 
main group suffering from a lack of access to documents are individuals identified as 
belonging to different Romani minorities, especially those who have been forcibly dis-
placed during the post-Yugoslav wars. The European Commission also clearly put strong 
emphasis on access to personal documents because they envisioned the potential prob-
lems associated with having a large group of de facto stateless EU citizens in the future. 
When combined with the rights of free movement afforded by the Free Movement of 
Citizens Directive, this situation was also perceived as a potential security issue (Van 
Baar, 2015: 75), since such populations could not be properly identified and thus effi-
ciently controlled. Different IOs (primarily UNHCR, but also the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe) and human 
Sardelić 11
rights advocacy NGOs, especially in the non-EU post-Yugoslav countries, became 
involved in bureaucratic procedures for acquiring the most basic documents, such as birth 
certificates, for legally invisible persons. A birth certificate, which until that time had not 
been available, was the basic document needed by legally invisible persons to subse-
quently prove their citizenship. While conducting my fieldwork in all of the non-EU post-
Yugoslav countries, I interviewed several IOs as well as human right advocacy NGO 
representatives who joined forces in the Western Balkans Legal Aid Network – WeBLAN 
(Kostić, 2013): PRAXIS from Serbia, Your Rights from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Civil 
Rights Programme from Kosovo, Legal Centre from Montenegro, Macedonian Young 
Lawyers Association from Macedonia, and Legal Centre from Croatia. WeBLAN was 
created because the problems faced by legally invisible persons without any identity doc-
uments go beyond the boundaries of more than one state. WeBLAN was connected to 
the UNHCR in the region, on one hand, and to grass-root Romani NGOs, on the other. 
While providing assistance with securing identity documents to many individuals, 
they also ensured sustained awareness-raising campaigns. Through these campaigns, 
WeBLAN made sure that legally invisible Romani individuals would not remain 
invisible to the general public in the region and also in the EU. WeBLAN has continued 
these campaigns to the present day, although the visa liberalization process for most of 
the Western Balkan countries has now been concluded. Visa-free regimes have been 
introduced despite the failure by the states in question to meet all Block 4 conditions 
(Kacarska, 2012: 6). Many Romani individuals remain undocumented and continue to 
be legally invisible. These campaign activities by WeBLAN can be compared to the 
activities of civil society organizations, who advocated against discrimination of Romani 
migrants in the EU in the area of the freedom of movement. They were, namely, all 
enacting their citizenship in solidarity with the rights of their co-citizens (Faure Atger, 
2013: 189).
As I interviewed representatives of these NGOs, all of them pointed out what being 
legally invisible entails: a legally invisible individual has no access to health care, employ-
ment, or education. In other words, such a person is not entitled to any of the rights an 
individual would be entitled to not only as a citizen but also as a resident. In addition, one 
of my informants from WeBLAN revealed that many legally invisible persons were also 
vulnerable to becoming victims of human trafficking and trafficking in human organs 
(interview, 3 December 2012).
The question arises as to how any of these individuals cope and survive with their 
irregularized statuses and legal invisibility. The irregularization of their status represents 
one of the severest severances of the ‘social contract’ between an individual and the state 
(De Genova, 2015: 194). Yet as Sigona (2015: 276) argued in his analysis of everyday 
stateless Roma individual in Italy, these individuals are ‘neither rightless nor agency-
less’. This was also confirmed during my fieldwork in the post-Yugoslav space. I con-
ducted participant observation in Romani communities and refugee camps, where I 
encountered, and had informal talks with many Romani legally invisible persons. 
However, instead of highlighting their individual life stories, I will focus on three par-
ticular practices undertaken by legally invisible Roma that were noted in official docu-
ments of IOs and national governments, as they were seen as disruptive for the state 
system. These were also described by the NGO activists whom I interviewed during my 
fieldwork. I argue that the practices in question are in fact the enactment of citizenship 
by legally invisible Romani individuals and not just personal coping strategies to gain 
access to certain rights. For example, without formal access to the labour market or 
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social benefits, they create their own alternative economic niches (such as collection of 
scrap metal) and in so doing produce their own sources of income. However, with their 
own invisibility, their labour is invisible as well. Another even more telling case reveals 
how legally invisible people access health care without having the right to access. As it 
has been highlighted in certain documents (UNHCR, 2011), but also confirmed by my 
interlocutors from WebLAN and Romani communities, many pregnant, legally invisible 
women borrow health insurance cards from other women when they are about to give 
birth. This wide-spread practice in the Romani community ensures access to health care 
for those who would otherwise not be eligible for it. However, it also causes difficulties 
for birth registration since the identity of the real parents of a child becomes obscured. 
An activist shared a story with me about the leader of a Roma NGO, who used to proudly 
pronounce that his wife had given birth 15 times in 1 year. Although this practice is 
mostly interpreted as a problematic behaviour by Roma, it can also be understood as the 
enactment of their citizenship. Through these actions, Roma individuals raise awareness 
about being compelled to engage in these alternative practices, in order to access rights 
which their co-citizens take for granted. Legally invisible individuals can in this way 
gain access to these basic rights by subverting the system. As a result, their agency and 
their practices can be understood as the acts of (semi)citizenship and as acts of their 
European ‘citizenship-to-come’ (Isin, 2015: 20). Through this behaviour, these individu-
als demonstrate that once their post-Yugoslav countries become full EU members, they 
will also have to be granted legitimate access to these basic rights. In one interview 
(conducted on 3 December 2012), a human rights activist said that many legally invisi-
ble persons wanted to regularize their status and gain identification documents including 
birth certificates. However, they still do not see prospects of better access to health care, 
education, or labour markets in their own country because they remain semi-citizens. 
Instead, they exercise the right to free movement gained with documents to migrate from 
their own country. This coping strategy is yet another enactment of citizenship showing 
that simply having de jure access to rights does not necessarily mean de facto access in 
everyday life. Many Romani individuals are aware of this difference and thus choose to 
exercise alternative forms of agency to introduce ruptures into a system that otherwise 
discriminates against them.
Conclusion
This article sets out to comparatively investigate the position and agency of Romani 
migrants with, and without, EU citizenship. I argued that precisely because of Romani 
semi-citizenship position, EU states can easily irregularize their migrant statuses and 
render them unwanted migrants, who can be expelled. However, this is only a part of the 
story on semi-citizenship, which does not completely explain how the position of 
Romani migrants is shaped, reshaped, and transformed. First, discriminatory practices 
towards Romani migrants attracted a lot of attention from civil society organizations 
while also catalysing the establishment of the Romani movement (Vermeersch, 2006). 
However, the Romani migrants themselves enact their citizenship in ways that are con-
sistent neither with the expectations of state authorities nor with civil society organiza-
tions advocating for their rights. As long as their status is irregularized by the state, they 
remain invisible in global politics. They become visible as soon as they enact their semi-
citizenship position and irregularized migrant status. These acts of citizenship open new 
spaces of existence beyond mere legal existence. They show creative and innovative 
practices by those located on the margins of formal citizenship. With their agency they 
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do not just demonstrate how they are discriminated against; they also reveal ruptures 
within the system of rights that should be granted to all citizens and migrants alike. 
Despite their irregularized status, Romani migrants become global players in interna-
tional politics by virtue of their agency – they point to discrepancies among the rules set 
to govern in this space. While this article only allowed me to analyse two case studies, I 
think similar patterns would be confirmed by analysing the position of Romani asylum 
seekers from Hungary in Canada and many other cases, where the position of Romani 
migrants has been irregularized. By analysing additional cases, we will be able to 
witness further ways that Romani individuals react to irregularization through uncon-
ventional practices. It is this creative agency that precisely demonstrates that there are 
possibilities to move beyond the limitations set by those who position Romani migrants 
on the margins of European citizenship.
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